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Summary findings
In developing and industrial countries alike, there is  programs, to see which they would choose. The authors
concern that health and safety policy may respond to  then examined what factors (qualitative and quantitative)
irrational fears - to the "disaster of the month"'-  seem to influence these choices.
rather than address more fundamental problems.  Respondents were asked about pairs of programs,
In the Ulnited  States, for example, some policymakers  among them: smoking education or industrial pollution
say the public worries about trivial risks while ignoring  control programs, industrial pollution control or
larger ones and that funding priorities reflect this view.  pneumonia vaccine programs, radon eradication  or a
Many public health programs with a low cost per life  program to ban smoking in the workplace, and radon
saved are underfunded,  for example, while many  eradication or programs to ban pesticides.
environmental regulations with a high cost per life saved  The survey results, they feel, have implications beyond
are issued each year.  the United States. They find that, while qualitative
Does the existing allocation of resources reflect  aspects of the life-saving programs are statistically
people's preoccupation with the qualitative aspects of  significant in explaining people's choices among them,
risks, to the exclusion of quantitative  factors (lives  lives saved matter, too. Indeed, for the median
saved)i Or can observed differences in the cost per life  respondent  in the survey, the rate of substitution
saved of environmental and public health programs be  between  most qualitative risk characteristics and lives
explained bv the way the two sets of programs are  saved is inelastic. But for a sizable minority of
funded?  respondents, choice among programs appears to be
Cropper and Subramanian examine the preferences of  insensitive to lives saved. The interesting question for
U.S.  citizens for health and safety programs. They  public policy is what role the latter group plays in the
confronted  a random sample of  1,000 U.S. adults with  regulatory process.
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There is concern in the U.S. that the public  worries about trivial risks while ignoring
larger ones.  For example, people worry about traces of trihalomethane  in their drinking
water, but will not buckle their seatbelts  or give up smoking. Even more troubling  is the fact
that large amounts  of money  are spent on programs  that reduce trivial risks while programs
that are more cost-effective  and address more serious risks are ignored.
A.  Disparities  in Cost-Per-Life  Saved of Environmental  and Public Health
Programs
An example  that is often cited to support  this view is that many public health programs
with a low cost-per-life  saved are underfunded,  while many environmental  regulations  with a
high cost-per-life  saved  are issued  each year. To illustrate,  a program to detect and treat
breast cancer among women over the age of 50 has been estimated  to cost less than $15,000
per life-year saved (Eddy 1989), while the cost-per-life-year  saved  of a regulation  to reduce
airborne exposure  to benzene  is approximately  $5,000,000  (Van Houtven and Cropper 1994).
If resources  were allocated  to life-saving  programs  to maximize  the social utility from
saving lives, then the ratio of marginal  costs-per-life  (or life-year)  saved would, indeed, equal
the ratio of marginal utilities received  from saving  lives in one program versus another. In the
above example, the ratio of marginal  costs-per-life-year  saved  would imply that society
considered  a life-year saved  by preventing  exposure  to benzene  to be 333 times as valuable  as2
a year of life saved through the breast cancer screening program.
It is not,  however, obvious that disparities in cost-per-life saved reflect public
preferences.  Rather, many of the differences in the cost-per-life saved of environmental and
public health programs can be explained by the way in which the two sets of programs  are
funded.  Environmental health programs generally are off-budget items whose costs are not
transparent to the public, whereas public health programs typically are funded from tax
dollars.  Since there is no direct mechanism to compare costs across the two sets of programs,
it is difficult to infer the value people place on life-saving programs simply by observing the
amounts that are currently  spent on various programs.
B.  Public  Choices Between Life-Saving  Programs
For these reasons, we decided to confront people directly with choices between
hypothetical environmental health and public health programs to see which they would choose.
In a national survey of 1,000 households, we asked people to choose between implementing
life-saving programs in the pairs listed in Table  1.  Specifically, we described in detail the
programs in one of the pairs (selected randomly from the table) including the number of lives
saved.  Respondents were asked to choose which of the programs they favored implementing.
The choice was then repeated for another program pair.
By varying across respondents the ratio of lives saved by the programs in each pair, we
are able to infer the ratio--for each pair of programs--that makes the median respondent
indifferent between both programs.  This gives us a measure of how many lives saved by
drinking water treatment,  say, are equivalent to a life saved by a colon cancer screening3
program. The question  of interest is how this ratio compares  with the cost per life saved by
the two programs at current levels of implementation. Are rates of substitution  between lives
saved in one program and lives saved in another as extreme as cost figures suggest?
C.. The Effect of Qualitative  Characteristics  on Preferences  for Life-Saving
Programs
We are, however, interested  not only in the choices that people make when confronted
with pairs of life-saving  programs, but in the reasons  for their choices. Chauncey  Starr (1969)
suggested  many years ago that the existing allocation  of resources  among life-saving  programs
reflects people's preoccupation  with the qualitative  aspects  of risk.  People  are concerned  not
only with the number of lives a program will save; they  care about whether the risk is
voluntary or involuntary, whether  it is "dreaded",  or whether it is familiar or unfamiliar, and
so on (Slovic, Fischhoff and Lichtenstein  1985).
We wished to see whether  people's choices  among life-saving  programs are indeed
influenced  by qualitative  attributes  of risk (voluntariness,  controllability)  and by other
qualitative  aspects of each program--how  the program  is funded, whether  the nature of the
program is judged to lie within the proper scope  of government  activity. To do this we asked
each respondent--after  he had made his choices  for both program pairs--to  place each program
on a series of 10-point  scales, similar to those used in the psychometric  literature. This gave
us the respondent's  perceptions  of 8 qualitative  characteristics  (described  below) for each
program. Under the assumption  that perceived  qualitative  characteristics  of risk-reducing
programs enter the consumer's utility function  along with the number  of lives saved, we have4
estimated  the weights  people place on qualitative  characteristics  versus lives saved.
This enables us to answer the following  questions:
*  Which qualitative  risk and program characteristics  are important  in explaining
people's choices among  environmental  and public health programs?
*  Does the number of lives saved matter in choices  among  programs?
*  How important  are the risk and program  characteristics  in relation  to the
number  of lives saved  by a program? Specifically,  what is the elasticity  of each
qualitative  characteristic  with respect  to the number  of lives saved?
*  Given a vector of qualitative  characteristics  describing  each program, how many
more lives would  one program have to save compared to another to make the
median respondent  indifferent  between  them?
The answers to these questions  are presented  below.  Our results indicate that people
care both about the qualitative  and other characteristics  of hypothetical  regulatory  programs
and about number of lives saved in choosing  among  life-saving  programs: All but one of the
program characteristics  discussed  in the next section  are statistically  significant  in predicting
program choices. The number  of lives saved is also strongly  significant.
As a measure of the relative importance  of qualitative  factors  versus lives saved, we
calculate the number  of lives program A must save relative  to program B to make the median
respondent  indifferent  between  the two programs,  given his perception  of their qualitative
attributes. For the six pairs of the programs  in the survey, this ratio is never greater than 2.5--
far lower than the disparities  in cost-per-life  saved  reported above. This focus on the median
respondent, however, ignores heterogeneity  of preferences. For 20 to 30 percent of
respondents,  the qualitative  aspects  of air and water pollution  control programs are so
important  that respondents  always choose these  programs  regardless  of the number of lives5
saved by the public health program in the pair.  There is, therefore, a significant  minority
whose willingness  to trade qualitative  program characteristics  versus lives saved might well be
characterized  as irrational in the sense of Starr (1969)  and Viscusi (1992).
The paper is organized  as follows. The next section  discusses  in detail the qualitative
characteristics  on which the study focuses and relates them to the literature on risk perception
and preferences  for risk regulation. Section  III presents  the conceptual  framework  and the
statistical  model used to formalize  the relationship  between  people's choices of life-saving
programs, qualitative  program characteristics  and lives saved. Section IV describes  the survey
methodology  and the structure  of the questionnaire. Sections  V and VI present the results of
the study. Section V describes  the findings  from the raw data, while section  VI presents
results from the formal statistical  model. The paper ends with a discussion  of the policy
implications  of the survey.
H.  QUALITATIVE CHARACTERISTICS  AND PREFERENCES  FOR LIFE-SAVING
PROGRAMS
The characteristics  on which we have chosen to focus are those that, in general, differ
between environmental  and public health  programs. These characteristics,  listed in Table 2,
fall into two groups. The first group consists  of characteristics  of the risks targeted, which
have been studied  previously  in the psychometric  literature  (Slovic, Fischhoff and Lichtenstein
1985). The second comprises  characteristics  of the particular  programs  to control health and
safety risks.  These characteristics,  which deal with the perceived  intrusiveness  of programs,
how they are funded and how effective  people perceive  them to be, have not been studied in
the literature on preferences  for risk regulation.6
A.  Risk Characteristics  Studied
In the focus groups that we conducted  prior to our survey, two of the risk
characteristics  studied  in the psychometric  literature--voluntariness  and controllability--were
often mentioned  as reasons for choosing  pollution  control programs  dver other health and
safety  programs.
Blame (Voluntariness)
Exposure  to air and water pollution was viewed by most focus group members  as
involuntary--people  were not responsible  for being exposed  to air and water pollution and
therefore not to  blame for their exposure. By contrast, health risks such as heart disease
(caused by diet or inactivity)  or lung cancer (from smoking)  were perceived  as risks for which
people are themselves  partly to blame.  Henceforth  we use the term Blame refer to how
responsible  people are for being exposed  to a risk.
Ease of Avoiding Risk (Controllability)
Related  to the concept  of blame, yet distinct from it, is the notion of how easy it is to
avoid a risk.'  In the literature  on risk reduction,  how easy it is to avoid (or control) risks is an
important  determinant  of desires for risk regulation. If a risk is perceived  as difficult to avoid,
then people are more likely to want the government's  help in controlling  the risk.  In our
focus groups, environmental  risks such as air pollution  or pesticide  residues  on food were
'To see that the two concepts  are distinct,  consider  the following  examples. People  are
certainly  not to blame  if a carcinogen  enters the municipal  drinking  water  supply;  however,  it is
relatively  easy  to avoid  the carcinogen  by buying  bottled  water. In the case of smoking,  smokers
are certainly  to blame  for their habit,  yet, due to the addictive  nature  of nicotine,  it may  be difficult
for them to control  it.7
usually viewed as difficult to avoid.  Health and safety risks such auto accidents and smoking
were viewed as easier to avoid.  Ease of avoidance is the second of the risk characteristics on
which we focus.
Two other characteristics that have been found important in explaining people's
preferences for risk regulation are the Seriousness of the risk (Vlek and Stallen 1981) and
whether the respondent feels himself to be personally at risk (Personal risk) (Slovic, Fischhoff
and Lichtenstein  1985).
Seriousness of Risk
In the psychometric literature and in this survey, Seriousness of risk is not defined for
the respondent, but left to individual interpretation.  Perceived seriousness of risk could,
therefore,  reflect the severity of health consequences due to the risk, or the potential number
of fatalities based on the number of people exposed to the risk.
Personal Risk
Studies by Carson and Horowitz (1991a,  1991b, 1992),  Beggs (1984) and Mendeloff
and Kaplan (1989) have found Personal risk to be very significant in explaining people's
preference for risk reduction.  Our focus group participants often reacted to risks such as
smoking or cancer on the basis of personal experience and the potential the risk had for
affecting them or their family members.
B.  Program Characteristics Studied
While psychometric studies have carefully examined the risk characteristics discussed
above, they have not looked at risk reduction in the context of specific programs.  The8
literature  related to life-saving  programs also has paid little attention  to program-specific
characteristics  (Horowitz  and Carson 1991a, 1991b, 1992; Mendeloff  and Kaplan 1989;
Beggs 1984). Factors such as people's perception  of whether a program is effective, whether
the method  of funding  the program is fair, and how  appropriate  it is for the government  to
provide the service have not been examined  for their effects on program  choice.
Participants  in the focus groups we conducted  suggested  that people attach as much
importance  to the manner in which  a risk is regulated  as they do to which  risk is reduced. In
explaining  choices we asked them to make between  environmental  and other health and safety
programs, respondents  often mentioned  the first three program characteristics  described  below:
Efricacy  of the program
People  often expressed skepticism  about the effectiveness  of public health or safety
programs, especially  those that require  cooperation  from members  of the target population, or
that seek to change behavior. For example, most people were skeptical  that a tax on cigarettes
would discourage  smoking.  By contrast, environmental  programs were not viewed  as
requiring  cooperation  from beneficiaries  to be effective--everyone  benefits ipso  facto from
breathing cleaner  air or drinking cleaner water.
Appropriateness  of government  intervention
Focus group participants  sometimes  resented government  interference  in behavior
modification  or on issues that involved  personal  choice, such as the right to smoke or to
choose not to wear a helmet  on a motorbike. Safety  programs such as mandatory  airbags in
automobiles  were criticized  as infringing  on people's right to choose. Similarly, government
provision  of public health services such as vaccinations  were viewed  as "socialized  medicine."9
Regulations  to control pollution, by contrast, were more likely to be viewed as within the
appropriate scope  of government  activity.
Fairness  of the funding mechanism
In focus groups, public health  programs were sometimes  viewed as inequitable  because
the costs of these programs are usually  distributed  across  the population  while the benefits are
not.  Typically, public health programs are funded  out of general tax revenues but are targeted
at high-risk  groups rather than at the general population. Most pollution  control programs, by
contrast, were viewed  as being paid for either by the persons  who benefit from the pollution
(stockholders,  employees  and consumers  of the polluting  firm), or by people who benefit from
pollution control (drinking  water treatment  paid for by user fees).
Time at which the program  begins  to save lives
The last program characteristic,  the Time  before the program  saves lives, was included
to see if people's tendency  to discount  future lives saved (Cropper, Aydede  and Portney 1991,
1992, 1994) was robust to the inclusion  of other characteristics  in the description  of life-saving
programs.
C.  Choice of Program  Pairs
In selecting health  and safety  programs with which  to confront respondents,  we wanted
to assure that the programs in each pair differed in the above characteristics. It was, therefore,
natural to select  pairs consisting  of one environmental  and one public health  program. 2 To
2We  classify  programs  that clean  up air or water pollution  or toxic substances  as
environmental  health  programs. Our public  health  programs  either  directly  provide  health services10
make the choice between programs more meaningful, we sought programs that targeted the
same health endpoint--for example, respiratory illness or cancer.  We also sought programs
whose primary benefit was life-saving, rather than reduction in illness or environmental
(ecosystem) benefits, due to difficulties in measuring (and hence controlling for) the latter.
Subject to these constraints, the environmental programs chosen also possessed the
following features: (a) they addressed problems that pose the greatest risk to human health
according to the EPA (USEPA 1987, 1990); (b) they included regulations that have been cited
as objectionable because of the high cost-per-life saved (OMB 1993); and (c) they included
regulations that entail high total costs and thus may result in a significant misallocation of
resources.  The public health programs were chosen to target the same health endpoint as the
environmental ones--cancer, respiratory illness and heart disease.
The six program pairs used in the survey and the diseases they target are presented in
Table  1.  The environmental programs include control of air pollution by factories and autos,
drinking water treatment and restricting pesticide residues on food.  The public health
programs include colon cancer screening, smoking education and pneumonia vaccinations.
An exception to the rule that both programs in a pair target the same disease is pair 3.
The Dual Airbags and the Auto Emissions Reduction programs address deaths related to
(cancer screening, vaccinations) or safety (airbags in cars), or health education (smoking
education).  We realize that some of the programs that we classify as environmental health, such
as drinking water treatment, have traditionally  been classified as public health programs.  All of
our public health programs, however, have the property that they serve people "one at a time."
Thus radon control, because it occurs on a house-by-house basis, is classified as a public health
program, whereas controlling air pollution from factories and banning smoking the workplace are
considered environmental health programs because of the greater number of people affected.11
automobiles.  Though the link here is rather tenuous, the combination  provides for some rich
variation in characteristics,  such as appropriateness  of government  role in risk reduction
(mandatory  installation  of airbags  is sometimes  seen as intruding on individual  rights) and
timing of benefits (the airbags  program begins to save lives right away  compared to the auto
emissions,  program).
To see whether respondents  perceived  the programs in each pair as differing in the
eight characteristics  of interest, Table 3 gives the ratio of the mean scale ratings that
respondents  assigned  the two programs  in each pair for each characteristic. To illustrate, the
ratio 0.95 under "Efficacy  of Program" for Pair 1 implies that the mean efficacy score
assigned to the smoking  education  program  was 95% of the mean score assigned  to the
industrial  pollution  prevention  program.
Two conclusions  stand  out:  For the program  pairs studied, people perceived  greater
differences  in the last four characteristics  in Table 3 than in the first four.  Three of these are
risk characteristics  that have been studied  extensively  in the psychometric  literature (Ease of
Avoiding  Risk, Blame, Personal  Risk), the fourth  is the Timing of Lives Saved. The program
characteristics  that we hypothesize  should  help to explain choices are not perceived  as differing
as much  between environmental  and public  health programs  as the traditional  risk
characteristics.
As will be seen below, however, large differences  in perceived  characteristics  do not
necessarily  imply that these characteristics  are important  in predicting  choices. Indeed, it is
the first four of the characteristics  in Table 3 that turn out to be the most important  qualitative
factors explaining  program choices.12
We turn now to the formal model  that is used to explain choices made between life-
saving  programs.
III.  CONCEPTUAL  FRAMEWORK
A.  Utility Received from a Life-Saving Program
We assume that an individual's  utility from a life-saving program is a function of the
number of lives saved by the program,  X, and a vector of qualitative risk and program
characteristics, C.  The wording of our questionnaire implicitly assumes that utility is
multiplicatively separable in  X  and  C,
U =  f(C)X,  (1)
implying that the choice between any two life-saving programs will depend on the ratio of
lives saved by the two programs.3
In our empirical work we assume that the utility function of person i  takes the form,
U,  =  (C,i)"  (C 2i) 2 (C3i)"  ...  (Cni)p Xi  (2)
where  Xi  Number of lives saved by the program  (as presented to respondent i)
Ck=  Characteristic  k describing  the program (as perceived  by respondent  i)
k=1, 2,..n.4
3In focus groups and pretests, respondents found it easier to understand and respond to ratios
rather than absolute numbers or differences. Therefore, the number of lives saved by the two
programs was given to the respondents as a ratio.
'This is the actual form of the utility function used in our empirical work.  It has the advantage
that it does not impose curvature restrictions on the utility function--characteristics may alter
utility at an increasing or at a decreasing rate.  It also fit the data better than the semi-log form of
the utility function.13
The utility that an individual derives from the lives saved by a program (Xi) is thus modified
by the qualitative characteristics of the program (Ci), as the individual perceives them.
The parameters of the utility function,  {P},  determine the ease with which the
individual is willing to trade qualitative characteristics for lives saved.  Formally,  Pk
represents. the elasticity of lives saved with respect to characteristic  k--the percentage change
in lives saved corresponding to a percentage change in the characteristic that keeps the
individual equally satisfied.  If  Pk  exceeds one in absolute value, then the individual's
indifference curve between characteristic  k  and lives saved is elastic (as is curve A in Figure
1) implying,  as in Figure  1, that if the Seriousness of the risk a program targets increases by
10% the number of lives the program saves can decrease by more than 10% and keep utility
constant. 5 The lower is  Pk, the less willing the individual is to trade lives saved for
qualitative characteristics (as is the case for curve B in Figure  1) and, according  to some policy
analysts (Viscusi 1992), the more "rational" the individual is.
B.  A Model of Choice Between Life-Saving Programs
Consider now the respondent's choice between two life-saving programs.  Using
subscripts  A  and B  to denote the two programs,  the individual will prefer program  A  iff
UA >  UB.  In practice, all of the program characteristics that are relevant to the individual's
choice will not be observable.  Let us denote by  eAi  and eB 3 the unmeasured characteristics of
the programs  as perceived by respondent i, and assume that
'The more elastic the indifference curve the more steeply sloped it is, since the slope of the
indifference curve varies inversely with  3, e.g.,  dC,/dX = -(l/,j)(Cj/X).14
UAi  =  (CAI)"  (CA2i)  (CA3i).....  *(CAJ  XAi eAi  (3)
UEi  =  (CE11)"  (C82 p2 (CB 3i)  ....  (CBn)  XBi eBi-  (4)
Under the assumption  that eAi  and eBE  are independently  and identically  distributed for
all i, the individual's choice between  the two programs  is described  by a random utility model.
Assuming  that ln(eAi  /eBj)  is normally  distributed  with mean zero and variance a2,  the
probability of choosing  Program A is given by a probit model,
cD[  (1/a) ln(XAi/XBj)  +  4(Bk/a) 1n(CAki/CBkJ]  (5)
The econometric model  that we estimate  is more complicated  than this.  This is because
after an individual  has chosen between  program A and program B at a given lives saved ratio,
the ratio is varied and the individual  is asked to choose  once again. 6 Each individual's
contribution  to the likelihood  function is the probability  that he made the choice he was
observed to make (AA, AB, BA  or BB)  at the XAi/XBi ratios with which he was confronted (see
the Appendix for a more complete  description  of the model).
Estimation  of this model  enables  us to compute  the elasticities Bk, and hence to infer
which of the program characteristics  described  in section II are most important  in explaining
choices among life-saving  programs. The model  allows us to answer other policy questions  as
well.  For example, once the utility function  parameters  have been estimated, we can ask for
6It is well  known  that the use of a double-bounded  dichotomous  choice  question  increases  the
efficiency  of parameter  estimates  for a given sample  size (Hanemann,  Loomis  and Kanninen
1991).15
any arbitrary pair of programs (C vectors) how many more lives one program must save than
the other to make the median respondent indifferent between the two programs.  The question
of policy interest is whether this ratio is as large as disparities in cost-per-life saved would
suggest.
IV.  SURVEY METHODOLOGY
A. Description of the Survey
We asked people to choose between hypothetical (though realistic) life-saving programs
in a telephone survey conducted by the Survey Research Center at the University of Maryland
between September and December of 1993.7 Using a random digit dialing procedure,  a
national random sample of 1,476 households was selected.  Of these households, 8% could not
be contacted and 4.3%  had miscellaneous problems, such as language difficulties or illness.
Of the remaini'.sg 1,294 households, 21.7%  refused to participate.  This study is based on the
1,013 interviews that were completed.
Though the socioeconomic profile of our sample compares fairly well with the
corresponding national statistics,'  it is important to point out the differences.  Our sample has a
smaller representation of blacks (9.7% compared to a national figure of 12.4%), and a higher
71n  order to develop the questionnaire, we held eight focus groups, followed by a series of
pretests. The focus groups not only helped in the selection of programs and qualitative
characteristics to be studied, but also helped identify terminology with which people were familiar.
The pretests helped to identify and resolve problems with the questionnaire. The most significant
of these pretests was a national pilot survey of 202 respondents.
'The national statistics were obtained from the 1993 Statistical Abstract of the U.S.16
representation of college-educated people than the national average (27.9%  versus 18.4%).
We also have fewer younger people (7.6% of the group was between 18-24 years old as
compared to a national figure of  14.1 %) and a smaller percentage of households earning below
$50,000 than the national figure (69.7% instead of 74.2%).
B. Structure  of the Questionnaire
The survey, which took an average of 23 minutes, began with a set of warmup
questions that introduced the respondent to the environmental and public health theme of the
study and to the idea of choosing between alternatives.  Respondents were explicitly told that
the setting for the questions was in a hypothetical state, other than the one in which he or she
lived.  The purpose of this was to control for the respondent's  preconceived knowledge of
programs already in existence in his own state. 9
The main section of the survey confronted each respondent with two randomly selected
program pairs.  The structure of this part of the survey can be explained using program pair  I
for illustration.  For pair  1, the first program in the pair, the Smoking Education program,  was
briefly described and the specific objective that the program was expected to achieve was
9In focus groups, respondents sometimes failed to choose programs that they liked because
they believed programs already to be fully implemented. Our efforts in this regard were fairly
successful, judging from the fact that only about 30% of respondents said they thought that the
programs were to be implemented in their own state when they answered the questions.  More
than 57% of respondents said they thought of these programs occurring "nowhere in particular"
and 10% thought that the programs were to be implemented  in other states.17
explicitly stated.'0 The respondent's  belief about the program's  effectiveness in realizing the
objective was then elicited.
If the individual thought that the program was ineffective in achieving the stated
objective--if he gave it a rating of 3 or less on the 10-point scale--he was given a different pair
of programs."  The reason for branching respondents away from programs perceived as
ineffective was that they would be unlikely to believe claims about lives saved by these
programs. 12
The respondent was then told how the program would be funded--in this case, out of
tax dollars. Similar information was presented for the second program in the first pair, the
Industrial Air Pollution program.
The respondent was then asked to choose between the Smoking Education and the
Industrial Air Pollution programs with the costs and lives saved by the programs held constant.
Suppose that the smoking education program and the air pollution control program would save the SAME
number of lives EACH YEAR.
If both programs cost the same, which one do you think would be best for society?  Remember, the two
programs save the SAME number of lives EACH YEAR.
" 0The exact wording of the questions for Pair I appears in the Appendix.  The complete
questionnaire is available upon request from the authors.
"In branching respondents to alternate program pairs, care was taken to ensure that no
respondent got the same program in two pairs.  For instance, since both pairs I and 5 have an
Industrial Air Pollution program, an individual could get only one of the two pairs.
" 2The percentage of respondents who gave programs an efficacy  rating of  3 or below was less
than 12% for all programs except the radon programs.  Contrary to our expectations, public
health programs were judged no less efficacious  than environmental programs.18
Following the approach of Hanemann, Loomis and Kanninen (1991), a double-
sampling strategy was adopted as a means of tightening the bounds on the respondent's  choice
and improving the efficiency of the parameter estimates.  The program that was not chosen
was made more attractive, so that it saved x times more lives than the program favored
initially.
(For  those who chose  the Smoking  Education  program)
Suppose  that  instead  of saving the same  number  of lives,  the AIR POLLUTION  CONTROL  PROGRAM
saved  MORE  lives than  the smoking  education  program.  Suppose  that  it saved  [fill x] TIMES  as many  lives
as the srnoking  education  program.  Would  you still favor adopting  the smoking  education  program  or  would
you change  your  mind?
The [fill x] value was selected randomly from one of four values given in the
Appendix.  Respondents who initially chose the Industrial Air Pollution control program were
given a similar followup question with the new ratio of lives saved selected randomly from one
of four values.
Respondents were asked the reasons for their choices, first when both programs  saved
the same number of lives, as well as in the second round, when the ratio of lives saved by the
two programs was varied.  These open-ended responses served two purposes.  They enabled us
to verify that respondents understood the questions and reacted thoughtfully in choosing
programs.  Secondly, they elicited spontaneous factors that influenced respondent choices.
Immediately after these open-ended responses, the respondent was asked a series of
questions to see if he believed the information in the program descriptions and to see whether
he had considered non-life-saving benefits in making his choices.  Specifically, the respondent19
was asked whether he believed that both programs  could save the same number of lives for the
same cost, and, if not, which program which  program would cost more.  He was also asked
what benefits other than lives saved  had influenced  his choice  between the two programs.
After receiving  a second pair of programs,  the respondent  was asked to place each of
the four programs  with which he had been confronted  on 10-point  psychometric  scales, one for
each of the remaining  characteristics  in Table 2.  (Recall  that Efficacy was rated within each
program pair.)  For example, respondents  were asked:
How appropriate do you think it is for the govermment  to require schools to educate children about the
dangers of smoking? If I means not at all appropriate and 10 means very appropriate, what number from I
to 10 best describes how  appropriate it is for the govemment to require schools to educate children about
the dangers of smoking?
The survey  concluded  with standard  questions  about the respondent's  age, race, marital
status, income and education. Also  included  were questions  exploring his attitude to a national
health insurance  plan, asking the respondent  whether  he was a smoker, and also whether he
had lost a friend or relative to cancer or lung disease.
V.  SURVEY  RESULTS
A.  Choices Among  Life-Saving  Programs  with Lives Saved Held Constant
We shall  begin by examining  people's choices  between the programs in each pair, first
when both programs save the same number  of lives  and then when the number of lives saved is
varied.  Two results stand out:
(1)  When both programs in a pair saved  the same number of lives, a majority  of20
respondents  favored the environmental  program rather than the public health
program.
(2)  When the number of lives saved  was varied between  programs in a pair, there
was a clear shift in respondent  preference  to the program that saved more lives.
Table 4 presents  the percentage  of respondents  favoring  Program A over Program B for
each program pair when respondents  were told that both programs  in the pair saved the same
number of lives for the same  cost.  Analysis  of the respondents'  choices indicates  that there is,
indeed, a greater preference for environmental  health programs  in the first four pairs, which
have an environmental  program paired with a public health or safety program. If we consider
the smoking  ban program and the pesticide  regulation  program in pairs 5 and 6 as
environmental  programs  and the radon eradication  program as a public health/safety  program,
we see that respondents  have a greater preference  for environmental  programs relative to
public health programs in the last two pairs also.
B.  The Effect of Lives  Saved on Program  Choice
When the ratio of the number of lives saved  by both programs  was varied, the majority
of respondents  switched  to the program that saved  more lives. This is apparent from Figures
2-7 which show, for each program pair, the percentage  of respondents  choosing  program A as
XA/ XB  varies. The graphs of these distributions  display  a fairly uniform  pattern across all
program pairs.  For all pairs, the percentage  of respondents  choosing  program A increases  as
the ratio of lives saved by that program to lives saved  by program B increases. However, as is
evident from the graphs, the percentage  of respondents  choosing  the program that saves more21
lives does not increase monotonically  with the ratio of lives saved. The lack of monotonicity
implies that people appear to be reacting  to whether one program saves more lives than the
other, but not to the magnitude  of the change.
Another  interesting  finding  concerns the percent of respondents  who stayed with the
program they had originally  chosen, even when the alternate  program saved 50 to 100 times
more lives.  This number, which is as high as 30 percent for some  programs, suggests that a
significant  fraction  of the population  is indeed  insensitive  to the number  of lives saved.  In
Figure 2, for example, approximately  20 percent of people  continue  to favor the Industrial
Pollution  Control program when the Smoking  Education  program is alleged to save 100 times
more lives.  By contrast, 13 percent of people who originally  favored  the Smoking  Education
program continue  to favor it even when the pollution  control program is alleged to save 50
times more lives.  (The corresponding  percentages  for all programs  pairs appear in Table 5.)
A possible  explanation  for these findings  is that people  did not believe the extreme
ratios of lives saved that appear in Table 5.  We do, however, have evidence,  based on open
ended comments,  that people were willing to go along with the assumptions  stated in the
survey. The hypothesis  that people  did not accept our assumptions,  furthermore, cannot
explain why the ratio of people with (possibly)  lexicographic  preferences  varies across
programs. A striking  finding in Table 5 is that between  20 and 30 percent of respondents
continue to choose the pollution  control program in pairs 1 through  3, even when the public
health  program saves 100  times more lives.  Indeed,  Table 5 strongly  suggests that people are
less sensitive  to the number of lives saved for environmental  programs  than for public health
programs.22
C.  Other Factors Affecting Program Choice
Although respondents  were told that the two programs in each pair cost the same, the
difference in the perceived  costs of programs A and B could have been a factor that implicitly
affected the choice between public  health and environmental  health  programs. For instance,
the belief that the environmental  health program would  cost more could have driven some
people to choose the public health program  even though  they really preferred the
environmental  program for other reasons.
In order to control for people's beliefs  about program costs, people  were asked if they
thought both programs would cost the same if they saved the same number of lives, and if not,
which program would  cost more.  As seen in Table 6, most respondents  did not believe that
both programs would cost the same.  Respondents  perceived  the environmental  health program
to have a higher cost for pairs 1 and 4 (industrial  air pollution  program), and pair 3 (auto
emissions  program). In fact more than 75  % of the respondents  thought that the environmental
program would cost more in Pairs 1 and 3.  The exception  to the belief that environmental
programs cost more was pair 2, in which a majority  of respondents  believed  the colon cancer
screening  program to be more costly than a drinking  water treatment  program that would save
the same number  of lives. The cost of treating  cancer cases may  play a role here.  Radon
control was viewed by 58% of respondents  as more costly than a workplace  smoking ban (the
"costless"  health program), but no more costly than a pesticide  control program.
Another  possible  explanation  for respondents'  tendency  to favor environmental
programs is that they ascribed other benefits  to these programs  besides saving lives.  To23
control for such benefits, as soon as respondents  had made their choices, they were asked what
other benefits they had associated  with each program. Environmental  programs were seen as
generating  global environmental  benefits  (reduced  depletion  of the ozone layer, reduced
greenhouse  gas emissions)  as well as providing  cleaner air or purer water.  Respondents  also
believed that environmental  health programs would  improve overall health by reducing
illnesses  and would aesthetically  enhance  the surroundings. From Table 7 we see that  over
half of the respondents  who considered  an air pollution  control program mentioned
environmental  benefits as a reason for choosing  the program. These environmental  benefits
were sometimes  global (reduced  acid rain and ozone depletion)  and sometimes  local ("cleaner
air").
When asked explicitly what other benefits  were associated  with public health programs,
the most frequently  mentioned  benefits were reductions  in illness or injury, savings  of health
care costs and increased awareness  about health  risks.
VI.  ECONOMETRIC  ANALYSIS OF  PROGRAM  CHOICES
To analyze  the contributions  to program  choice of the 8 qualitative  factors, other
program benefits,  cost considerations  and lives saved, it is necessary  to estimate the random
utility model described  in section III.  This can be done for eachf  program pair, or by
combining  data from all six pairs. The advantage  of modeling  each pair separately  is that one
can see whether  the factors  affecting  choice are consistent  across  program pairs.  It is also
easier to interpret the effect of socio-economic  factors  on choice for specific  pairs.  For
example, whether the respondent  is a smoker may affect the probability  that he chooses the24
Smoking Education program (Program A) in pair 1, but is unlikely to affect the probability
that he chooses Program  A in general.
Because of the larger number of observations obtained when data from all six pairs are
combined,  we focus on the pooled model.  Dummy variables representing perceived benefits
of programs other than lives saved are included in the model (Other Benefits from  Program A
and Other Benefits from  Program B).  Similarly, dummies to represent perceived differences
in program costs have also been included (Program A Costs more and Program B Costs more).
Six dummies are included (Pair 1;, where I= l,2...6),  for each of the program pairs,  to
capture attributes of the programs in each pair that are not reflected in the 8 measured
qualitative characteristics or the number of lives saved.
A.  Significance of Qualitative Characteristics in Explaining Program Choices
When the pooled model is estimated (see Table 8), seven of eight qualitative
characteristics (as rated by respondents) are significant at conventional levels and all have the
expected sign. 3 All the program attributes--Efficacy of the program  in achieving stated
objectives, Appropriateness of government intervention,  Fairness of the  funding  mechanism,
7ime before the program begins to save lives--are statistically significant in explaining the
probability of choosing a program.  Among the risk characteristics, Seriousness of risk,
'31f  Program A is perceived as more efficacious  than Program B or log (efficacyA/  efficacyB)
>0, the median respondent has a greater probability  of choosing A.  Therefore, the expected sign
of Efficacy is positive.  Similarly,  if Program A saves lives at a later time than Program B or log
(time lagA/  time lagB)  >0, we would expect that the median respondent has a smaller probability of
choosing Program A, implying that the expected sign of Time lag of benefits would be negative.
The signs for the other qualitative variables given in the third column of Table 8  can be
interpreted in a similar manner.25
Personal risk, and Ease of avoiding risk are statistically  significant. The only variable  among
the qualitative  risk characteristics  that emerges as insignificant  is the extent to which people are
to Blame for  exposure to the risk.
One possible explanation  for the insignificance  of the  Blame variable may be due to
its collinearity  with Ease of avoiding risk.  In the case of smoking, people often blame the
smoker for voluntarily exposing  himself  to a risk; by the same  argument, they also believe  that
the smoker could easily avoid the risk (by stopping  smoking). Simple correlation tests
indicated  that Blame and Ease of avoiding  risk are indeed  significantly correlated. However,
when Ease of avoiding  risk is excluded  from the model  there is no notable change in the
estimated  coefficient  or standard  error of Blame. A possible  explanation  for our results is that,
although  people rate the programs  differently  in terms of how much  people are to blame for
needing them, our respondents  don't consider  people who are exposed  to pollution or even
people who are at risk of cancer because  of a poor diet to be very much to blame for their
situation. We are dealing with a class of risks  where there are, to some  extent, factors that
mitigate  personal  responsibility  for being exposed  to the risk.
Both of the "other benefit" variables, Other Benefits  from  Program A and Other
Benefits  from Program  B are also significant. If respondents  believed  that there were other
benefits from Program A other than life saving  benefits, then the probability  of choosing
Program A increased. In contrast, if respondents  believed  that there were other benefits from
Program B other than life saving  benefits, then the probability  of choosing  Program A
declined.
Dummy  variables  for pairs 3, 4, 5 and 6 were also statistically  significant  in explaining26
program choice.  Each of the pair dummies represents the unmeasured properties of the
programs in a pair.  The negative sign of the coefficient of Pair 3,  for instance,  implies that
the unmeasured positive characteristics of the auto emissions program outweigh the
unmeasured benefits of the air bag program, thus lowering the probability that the airbag
program is selected.  Similarly, the unmeasured qualities of the Industrial Air Pollution
program enhance the probability that it is chosen in Pair 4.  The coefficients of the pair
dummies for pairs 5 and 6 are both statistically significant but opposite in sign.  In pair 6, the
Pesticide Ban program's  desirable unmeasured attributes exceed those of the Radon program.
In pair 5, on the other hand, the unmeasured attributes of the Radon program are, on balance,
more positive than the unmeasured attributes of the Workplace Smoking Ban.  One possible
explanation for this difference between the two Radon program pairs could be caused by a
factor that is not explicitly included in the model--familiarity.  Risks from exposure to radon
and to pesticide residues are relatively unknown to the lay person.  However, people are very
familiar with smoking risks.  Therefore,  they may prefer to regulate radon, which is the more
unfamiliar risk.
Examining the coefficients of the pair dummies sheds light on the question "Do people
have an inherent preference for environmental programs,  when all factors, including other
benefits from programs,  are held constant?"  From the results in Table 8, there appears some
evidence of an inherent preference for environmental health programs in pairs 3, 4 and 6.  It
is, however,  difficult to be sure that we have captured all other benefits from environmental
programs; hence, it is possible that the dummy variables for pairs 3, 4 and 6 are actually
capturing ecological benefits.  One test of this is to look at the interaction between these27
dummy variables and the Other Benefit  dummies. To examine this interaction, the model  was
estimated  with only the qualitative  characteristics,  the number  of lives saved  and the six pair
dummies, excluding the Other benefits  variables. When the Other Benefit variables  are
omitted, the coefficients  of the Pair 3 and Pair 4 dummies  are slightly  higher, with smaller
standard errors, than in Table 8 and the coefficient  value and standard  error for the Pair 5
dummy are slightly lower.  Hence we cannot rule out interactions  between the Other benefits
variables  and the pair dummies. It is, therefore, difficult  to infer from Table 8 that
respondents  have an inherent  preference  for environmental  health programs.
B.  Significance of Lives Saved and Program  Costs in Explaining  Program
Choices
While qualitative  factors are significant  in explaining  program choices so, clearly, were
lives saved. The coefficient  of Lives Saved  is estimated  with great precision, both in the
pooled model (Table 8) and in the models  for each individual  program pair (presented  in the
Appendix).
To determine how readily people  were willing to substitute  qualitative  attributes for
lives saved, one must divide each of the coefficients  in Table 8 by the coefficient  of lives
saved, in order to estimate the elasticity  of substitution  between  characteristic k and lives
saved, Bk
Before  doing this, however, we must consider  the role of perceptions  about programs
costs in explaining  program choices. As noted above, most people  did not believe that both
programs in a pair would  cost the same  if they saved the same number  of lives.  Dummy
variables for the perception  that Program  A costs more and the perception  that Program  B28
costs more were included in the model to measure the impact of perceived cost on the
probability of choosing a program.
The results from estimating the model with perceived cost variables are presented in
Table 9.  Comparing the coefficient estimates with those in Table 8, it is apparent that
including the perceived cost variables does not change the coefficients of any of the
explanatory variables very much, except for the coefficients of the pair dummies.  Just as in
the model without the cost variables, all qualitative attributes (excepting Blame)  including
Other Benefits from programs  A and B are statistically significant and have the expected sign.
Of the two perceived cost variables,  Program A costs more has the expected negative sign but
is statistically insignificant in explaining choice.  The variable Program B costs more is
statistically significant, but has an unexpected negative sign".
One explanation for this anomaly could be that the variable Program B costs more  is
correlated with dummies for Pair 3 or Pair 1, whose coefficients show the greatest change
when the cost variables are introduced.  Simple correlation tests between a dummy
representing Pair 3 and/or Pair I  and Program B costs more suggest that  Program B costs
more  indeed captures the unmeasured desirable aspects of the environmental programs in Pair
1 and Pair 3.5
"Including perceived cost variables in the models for the individual  program pairs also
produced the same aberration in the coefficient estimates for Program B costs more.  The
coefficients were either insignificant  or had the wrong sign. The Appendix contains estimates of
models for the individual program pairs.
'5A dummy was created to have a value of I if respondents were confronted with pair 1 or pair
3, and a value of zero otherwise. The Pearson correlation coefficient between this dummy and
Program B costs more  was 0.375 and was statistically  significant  at the 0.01 level.29
C.  The Role of Demographic  Variables
Until now we have ignored the influence of respondent characteristics in explaining
choices. For example, one might expect smokers  to be less likely to favor a smoking
education program and more likely to favor a program to control industrial air pollution.'6
When the models  for individual  program pairs are estimated  including  respondent
characteristics,  the results indicate that none of the standard  socio-economic  variables--race,
income, education,  age, gender, marital  status--are  statistically  significant  in explaining
program choice for any of the program pairs. The lack of importance  of demographic
variables in explaining preference may be due to the fact that the qualitative characteristics are
capturing the effects of the socio-economic factors.  Regressions of the characteristics for each
program on demographic and economic variables revealed that, indeed, some of the
demographic variables (e.g.,  Race) were significant in explaining variations in qualitative
characteristics such as Seriousness of Risk, Fairness of Funding, and Appropriateness of
Government  intervention. For instance, blacks consider smoking and pneumonia to pose
significantly greater health risks than do whites, and they consider it more appropriate for the
government to provide smoking education and pneumonia vaccinations than do whites.  Blacks
also consider themselves to be at greater personal risk from smoking-related diseases than to
whites.
'6It is more meaningful to analyze effects of socio-economic variables for individual pairs
rather than for the aggregate model because environmental and public health programs in each of
the six pairs are not arranged in any particular order.30
D.  The Relative Importance of Qualitative Characteristics versus Lives Saved
As explained  before, the  P vector represents  the elasticity  of lives saved by a program
with respect to each risk and program characteristic.  Table 10 presents  the  13  coefficients  and
the corresponding  standard errors for each of the qualitative  characteristics. For example, the
elasticity  of lives saved  by a program to the Seriousness  of the risk it addresses  is -1.52.  This
implies that if there is a 100% increase  in the Seriousness  of the risk, people would be willing
to accept a  152% reduction in the number of lives saved by the program." 7
A striking feature of the table is that the point estimate  of the elasticity of substitution
between lives saved and the qualitative  characteristics  examined  is greater than one only for
Seriousness  of the risk and Program  efficacy. If one tests the null hypothesis  that each
elasticity is less than or equal to one against  the alternative  that it is greater than one, the null
hypothesis  is rejected  only for Seriousness  of the risk.  The coefficient  on Efficacy  of the
program is not significantly  different  from one, implying  that respondents  scale down the ratio
of lives saved presented  to them by the ratio of efficacy scores  for the two programs. All of
the remaining  elasticities  are significantly  below  one and, indeed, lives saved has a zero
elasticity with respect to the Extent of blame.  Table  10 certainly fails to suggest that people
are extremely sensitive  to the characteristics  studied  in choosing  among  life saving programs.
'7The interpretation  of the coefficient  on Efficacy  of the  program is somewhat  different  from
the interpretation  of the other P's.  Instead  of representing  the rate at which  the individual  is
willing to substitute lives saved for a characteristic, it determines by how much the respondent
scales  down number  of lives  saved  because  he believes  a program  to be ineffective.  While  the
ratio of lives saved  given  to the respondent  is XA/XB,  the effective ratio of lives saved is
(EA/EB)O(XA/XB),  where E 1 = Efficacy  rating given by the respondent to program I.  Table 10
implies  that one cannot reject  the hypothesis  that P = 1.31
It is, of course,  possible that we have failed to capture the characteristics that really
matter to people when they consider life saving programs.  To guard against this criticism,  we
use the model, which incorporates such factors in the dummy variables for each program pair,
to predict people's  choices among life saving programs.  Specifically, we use the estimated
model to ealculate the ratio of lives saved that will make the median respondent indifferent
between both the programs in each pair, assuming that his perceptions of program
characteristics (the Ci's) satisfy mean values.
Table  11 presents the ratio of lives that must be saved by the two programs  in a pair to
make the median respondent equally likely to choose either program.  What stands out is that
this ratio is never greater than 2.2--a value achieved only by the two radon programs--and is
usually considerably lower.  For example, the colon cancer screening program and the
program to clean drinking water are almost equivalent in qualitative attributes in the median
respondent's  view.  The former need only save 7% more lives than the latter.  The difference
is a little greater for the auto emissions program--it must save 20% more lives than the dual
airbag program.
While it is true that the median respondent is indifferent between public and
environmental health programs only if the public health program saves more lives, the number
of lives involved (as a multiple of the lives saved by the environmental program) is small.  In
particular,  this multiple is far smaller than widely accepted estimates of the ratio of the cost
per life saved of the environmental program to the cost per life saved of the public health
program.32
VII.  CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this survey  was to see what choices  people would make when asked to
decide whether to implement  a public health  or an environmental  health  program.  We also
wished to see whether  the choices made would  reflect information  about lives saved by the two
programs and people's own perceptions  of the qualitative  characteristics  of the programs. The
answer, for the programs and characteristics  studied, is that both qualitative  characteristics  and
lives saved matter: Lives saved  and seven out of eight qualitative  characteristics  studied  are
statistically  significant  in explaining  program choices.
For the median respondent, however, qualitative  characteristics  do not matter much.
The elasticity of substitution  between lives saved  and qualitative  characteristics  is significantly
greater than one only for one characteristic--Seriousness  of the risk.  More importantly, taking
all qualitative  characteristics  into account, the ratio of lives saved by two programs that makes
the median respondent  indifferent  between them is never greater than 2.5.  Put somewhat
differently, for the median respondent  a life saved  by the environmental  programs  we consider
is never more than two-and-one-half  times more valuable  than a life saved by the public health
program with which it is paired.
If the preferences  of the median  voter determined  the allocation  of funds  among public
and environmental  health programs, we would expect  the ratio of marginal  costs per life saved
to equal the rate at which the median  voter would  substitute  lives saved  by one program for
lives saved by another. To illustrate, if the median  voter allocated society's life saving  budget
we would expect, based on Table 11, that the ratio of the marginal  costs per life saved for a
program to control pesticide residues  on food and a radon control program to be 2.2.  In33
reality, one observes  ratios much greater than this, depending  on pesticide in question.  V  Why
is this the case?
One answer, suggested  by the paper, is that while the rate of substitution  between lives
saved  by different programs is not very large for the median  respondent, it is in fact infinite
for a significant  fraction  of respondents. As Table 5 indicates,  over 20 percent of respondents
who were faced with a choice between three of our environmental  health programs and a
comparable  public health program continued  to choose the environmental  program even when
the corresponding  public health  program saved 100  times as many lives. This suggests  that a
significant  (and perhaps vocal)  minority  of citizens  will not trade qualitative  program attributes
for lives saved. Moreover, these people  have a strong preference  for environmental  programs.
For this explanation  to be convincing,  however, one must believe  that the current levels at
which environmental  and public health  programs are implemented  reflect the preferences  of
this minority.
Another  answer, which we find more convincing,  is that there is currently no
mechanism  to ensure that trade-offs  are made across  environmental  and public health
programs. The two are approved  and funded in distinct  ways: Public health programs
generally  are funded out of tax dollars, as a result of legislative  votes.  Because  their costs are
salient, it is more likely that they are considered  when level of implementation  is decided.
"It is, of course, difficult  to estimate  the marginal  cost per life saved;  typically,  only average
cost per life saved  figures  are published. EPA  (1991)  estimated  that the cost-per-life  saved  of a
radon program  that would  test each home  for radon  and remediate  levels  in excess  of 4 pi/L  is
approximately  $650,000  (1990$). The cost per life  saved  of programs  to eliminate  pesticide
residues  on foods is often  in the tens of mnillions  of dollars  (Cropper,  Evans  et al. 1992).34
Environmental regulations, by contrast, are controlled only indirectly by the legislative
process.  Legislators fund regulatory agencies and write enabling legislation for these agencies,
but they do not write individual environmental regulations.  The cost of complying with these
regulations is, generally, less apparent than the tax burden associated with public health
programs:  We believe these facts may help to explain the apparent discrepancies between the
findings of this study and program implementation.35
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Table 1
PAIRS OF PREVENTIVE  HEALTH PROGRAMS
Progrrnm  Pair  Disease Targeled
Smoking Education  Heart and lung disease
Industrial Air Pollution Control
Colon Cancer Screening  Colon Cancer
Drinidng Water Treatmnent
Dual Airbags  Auto deaths
Automobile Emissions Control
Pneumonia Vaccinations  Lung disease
Industrial Air Pollution Control
Radon Control  Lung cancer
Workplace Smoking Ban
Radon Control  Cancer (unspecified)
Pesticides Ban39
Table  2
RISK  AND PROGRAM  CHARACTERISTICS  STUDIED
Risk Ch2ractfrisfcis Stiidied
Extent to which population served is to Blame for risk
(Voluntariness of Risk)
Ease of Avoiding Risk (Controllability  of Risk)
Seriousness of risk targeted
Whether Risk Affects Respondent Personally
Prograim Chararteristics Studiefd
Efficacy of the Program
Appropriateness of Government Intervention
Fairness of the Funding Mechanism
Time Before Program Begins to Save Lives40
TABLE 3
PERCEIVED DIFFERENCES  IN PROGRAM CHARACTERISTICS
Mean  Ratio (Characteristic  A/Characteristic  B)
Program  Characteristics  Smoking  Colon cancer  Dual airbags  in  Industrial  air  Radon control  Radon control
Education  v.  screening  v.  automobiles v.  pollution  in homes v.  in homnes  v.
Industrial  air  Drinking  Auto emission  control v.  Smoking ban  in  Pesticide ban
pollution  water  control  Pneumonia  the work place  on fruit
control  pollution  program  vaccine
control  program
Efficacy of program  0.95  1.04  1.13  0.95  0.87  0.95
Seriousness of risk controlled  1.03  1.01  1.09  1.27  0.79  0.81
Appropriateness of govt.  0.89  0.86  0.96  1.15  0.94  0.78
intervention
Fairness of program funding  0.83  1.12  1.05  0.93  0.88  1.07
Ease with which risk can be  2.55  1.31  1.96  0.57  1.06  1.31
avoided
Time lag before program  0.95  0.85  0.53  1.77  1.36  1.28
begins to save lives
Extent to which program  1.73  1.20  1.92  1.02  0.78  0.87
beneficiary is to blame
Respondent  at risk  0.87  1.11  1.22  1.23  0.70  0.6041
TABLE  4
PERCENTAGE  OF RESPONDENTS  CHOOSING  EACH PROGRAM
WHEN BOTH SAVE  THE SAME NUMBER  OF LIVES
Percentage  of  Total number  of
l  _____________________________________  respondents  respondents
1. Smoldng  education  45  259
Industrial  air pollution  55
2.  Colon cancer  screening  46  359
Drinking  water  polludon  54
3.  Dual airbags  in automobiles  46  402
Auto  emissions  program  54
4.  Industrial  air pollution  63  251
Pneumonia  vaccine  program  37
5.  Radon  in homes  35  250
Smoking  ban in the work  place  65
6.  Radon  in homes  28  178
Pesdcide  ban on fruit  7242
Table  5
Percentage of Respondents Who Did Not Switch Preferences
at Extreme Ratios of Lives Saved
Program Pairs  Lives  Saved  Ratio  Percentage  of  Choice  in second
XA/XB  respondents  round
Pair  1  0.02  12.9  AA
100.0  21.1  BB
Pair 2  0.2  14.8  AA
100.0  26.9  BB
Pair 3  0.02  12.3  AA
100.0  29.7  BB
Pair 4  0.003  15.0  AA
5.0  10.0  BB
Pair 5  0.02  10.9  AA
100.0  13.4  BB
Pair 6  0.05  4.75  AA
500.0  16.0  BB43
Table 6
RESPONDENTS' BELIEFS ABOUT PROGRAM COSTS
(Percent)
Program A  Program B  Programs
CostsMnre  CsMt  re  Msast  Saime
1.  Smoking education  5  73  22
Industrial air pollution
2.  Colon cancer'screening  44  22  34
Drinking water
pollution control
3.  Dual airbags in automobiles  16  53  31
Auto emission control program
4.  Industrial air
pollution control  66  13  21
Pneumonia vaccine program
5.  Radon control in homes  58  17  25
Smoking ban in the work place
6.  Radon control in homes  30  31  39
Pesticide ban on fruit44
Table 7
Program Benefits Other than Lives Saved
Programs  Percentage that  Percentage that  Percentage that
cited benefits other  mentioned  mentioned other
than lives saved  environmental  health benefits
benefits
Smoking Education'  56  6  23
Industrial. air Pollution  60  43  11
Colon Cancer  42  0  35
Screening
Drinking Water 2 51  3  15
Dual Airbags  26  0  19
Auto Emissions  59  41  10
Industrial Air Pollution  61  39  12
Pneumonia Vaccine 3 37  0  27
Radon  25  4  11
Smoking Ban 4 54  9  16
Radon  25  5  10
Pesticide Ban  43  14  10
Helps nonsmokers (3.5%); more pleasant homes (2%); saves smokers money (5.4%)
prevent tobacco companies from making money (1.8%).
2  Better tasting water (5.6%); purer/cleaner drinking water (12%).
3  Helps elderly (1.6); helps kids (2.4%).
Helps nonsmokers (6.4%); more pleasant workplace/homes (7.2%).45
TABLE  8
Probabilitv  that Program A is Preferred
Program Characteristic  Utility  function  coefficients  l-statistics  Expected  sign  of
(13/o)  coefficient
EFFICACY  OF PROGRAM*  0.5259  6.07  Positive
SERIOUSNESS  OF  RISK CONTROLLED*  0.6304  10.39  Positive
APPROPRIATENESS  OF GOVERNMENT.  0.3239  6.16  Positive
INTERVENTION*
FAIRNESS  OF PROGRAM  FUNDING*  0.1258  3.36  Positive
EASE WITH  WHICH  RISK CAN BE  -0.1154  -4.2  Negative
AVOIDED*
TIME LAG  BEFORE  PROGRAM  SAVES  -0.0644  -2.06  Negative
LIVES*
EXTENT  TO WHICH  PROGRAM  -0.0182  -0.65  Negative
BENEFICIARY  IS TO BLAME
RESPONDENT  AT RISK  0.0646  2.06  Positive
LIVES SAVED  0.4144  45.46  Positive
OTHER BENEFITS  FROM PROGRAM  A  0.2458  3.92  Positive
OTHER BENEFITS  FROM PROGRAM  B  -0.2711  -4.7  Negative
PAIR I DUMMY  0.0287  0.41  FavoredPgm.
PAIR 2 DUMMY  -0.093  -1.47
PAIR 3 DUMMY  -0.1224  -2.01  Auto  ermissions
PAIR 4 DUMMY  0.2804  3.52  Industrial  air
pollution
PAIR  5 DUMMY  0.1523  2.23  Radon
PAIR  6 DUMMY  -0.3093  -4.15  Pesticide  ban
LN(Charactenstic  of Program  A/Charactenstic  of Program  B)
*  The  coefficient  for Lives Saved  Ratio is I/o.46
TABLE 9
Probabilitv that Program A is Preferred
Program Charactenstic  Utility function  t-statistics  Expected  sign of
coefficients (P/G)  coefficient
EFFICACY OF PROGRAM*  0.5327  6.13  Positive
SERIOUSNESS OF RISK CONTROLLED*  0.6301  10.39  Positive
APPROPRIATENESS OF GOVERNMENT.  0.3219  6.11  Positive
INTERVENTION  _
FAIRNESS OF PROGRAM FUNDING*  0.1269  3.38  Positive
EASE WITH WHICH RISK CAN BE  AVOIDED*  -0.1135  -4.15  Negative
TIME LAG BEFORE PROGRAM BEGINS TO SAVE  -0.0635  -1.99  Negative
LIVES*  _  _  _  __  _  _  _  _
EXTENT TO WHICH PROGRAM BENEFICIARY IS TO  -0.0214  -0.77  Negative
BLAME
RESPONDENT AT RISK  0.0646  2.05  Positive
LIVES SAVED  0.4154  45.44  Positive
OTHER BENEFITS FROM PROGRAM A  0.2538  4.03  Positive
OTHER BENEFITS FROM PROGRAM B  -0.2603  -4.48  Negative
PROGRAM A COSTS MORE  -0.1054  -1.52  Negative
PROGRAM B COSTS MORE  -0.1596  -2.34  Positive
PAIR 1 DUMMY  0.1041  1.33
PAIR 2 DUMMY  -0.063  -0.95
PAIR 3 DUMMY  -0.0683  -1.05
PAIR 4 DUMMY  0.3246  3.91
PAIR 5 DUMMY  0. 1958  2.67
PAIR 6 DUMMY  -0.2861  -3.78
LN(Characteristic of Program A/Charactenstic  of Program.47
TABLE 10
ELASTICITIES OF LIVES SAVED
WITH RESPECT TO QUALITATIVE CHARACTERISTICS
Program Characteristic  -(Elasticity of lives saved with  Standard 1
respect to qualitative  error
characteristic)
EFFICACY OF PROGRAM  1.2692  0.2055
SERIOUSNESS OF RISK  1.5213  0.1457
CONTROLLED
APPROPRIATENESS OF  0.7812  0.1266
GOVERNMENT.
INTERVENTION
FAIRNESS OF PROGRAM  0.3036  0.0902
FUNDING
EASE WITH WHICH RISK  -0.2785  0.066
CAN  BE  AVOIDED
TIME LAG BEFORE  -0.1553  0.0764
PROGRAM BEGINS TO
SAVE  LIVES
EXTENT TO WHICH  -0.0439  0.0671
PROGRAM BENEFICIARY
IS TO  BLAME  l
RESPONDENT AT RISK  0.1559  0.075648
TABLE II
NUMBER OF LIVES SAVED BY EACH PROGRAM THAT MAKES
MEDIAN RESPONDENT INDIFFERENT  BETWEEN THEM
1. Smoking  education  159
Industrial  air pollution  control  100
2. Colon  cancer screening  107
Drinking  water  pollution  control  100
3. Dual airbags  in automobiles  100
Auto emission  control  program  120
4. Industrial  air pollution  control  100
Pneumonia  vaccine  program  162
5. Radon  control  in homes  206
Smoking  ban in the work  place  100
6. Radon  control  in homes  213
Pesticide  ban on fruit  100,.  49
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Sampling Procedures and Respondent Characteristics
in the National Survey
A random digit dialing procedure using a standard two stage Waksberg-Mitofskyl design
generated a national sample of 2,487 telephone numbers.  Of these telephone numbers 1,011 were found
to belong to non-households or were of unknown status and were therefore eliminated from the pool of
numbers from which survey respondents would be drawn. The target population for this survey were
adults (age 18 years or older) residing in the 1,476 households.
The target respondent from each household was selected at random by asking for the adult (age
18 or older) who would have the next birthday.  This is a standard method used in surveys to ensure that
respondents are not concentrated in certain demographic groups, without having to ask intrusive
questions about household composition.
Of the 1,476 househoids selected,  8%  could not be contacted and 4.3% had miscellaneous
problems, such as language difficulties and illnesses.  Of the 1,294 households that were contacted
21.7% respondents refused to participate in the survey. 2 This study is based on the 1,013 interviews that
were completed.
A demographic profile of these 1,013 respondents and that of the U.S. population for 1993 is
presented in fTable A.1.  Comparing the two columns in Table A.1,  there were fewer blacks in our
sample  (9.7%) than the national average (12.4%).  The respondents in the survey were more educated
(27.9% were college educated compared to a U.S. average of 18.4%). The sample also had a smaller
representation of households with incomes below $50,000 than the national figure of 74.2%.
With respect to the age groups included in the sample, the percentage of young people between
18 and 24 years was half that in the population  (7.6% instead of 14.1%). However, the percentage of
35-54 year olds in the sample exceeded their share in the population ( 42.4%  in the sample versus
34.8% in the population).  Finally, a larger percentage of women  (57%) were among the respondents
compared to the U.S. population (51.2%).
Sample weights.  Sample weights were assigned to each respondent:
*  To correct for the number of telephone numbers in a household.
*  To correct for the number of adults in a household.
*  To correct for under-representation of males.
*  To correct for under-representation of people with less than high school education.
Estimation of the model with the weighted data produced results that were not notably
different from the results from the unweighted data. (See Table A.2 for results using weighted
data).
I  The Waksberg-Mitofsky two-stage cluster sampling design gives all residential telephone number an equal
probability.
2  All telephone numbers in the sample were tried up to 20 times.  Respondents who initially refused were
recontacted by a specialist in refusal conversion.  As a result, the initial refusal rate of 31.9% declined to 21.7%.53
Table A.1
Demographic Characteristics of the Sample Compared with National Data
SAMPLE  PROFILE (%)  NATIONAL STATISTICS
_  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  ~(%  )
RACE
White  81.8  83.6
Black  9.7  12.4
Asian  2.2  3.2
Other  5.4  0.8
Refused  0.9
GENDER
Male  43  48.8
Female  57  51.2
INCOME
Below $ 20,000  18.9  Below 25,000  41.7
$20,000-30,000  18.0  25-35,000  15.2
$30,000-50,000  32.8  35-50,000  17.3
$50.000-75,000  16.7  50-75,000  15.4
Above $75,000  13.6  Above 75,000  10.4
EDUCATION
Elementary School  11.3  20.8
High School Graduate  37.2  35.7
Some College  23.0  25.1
College Graduate  16.5  12.5




18-24 years  7.6  14.1
25-34 years  21.0  22.9
35-44 years  26.8  21.0
45-54 years  15.6  13.8
55-64 years  11.6  11.2
Over 65 years  16.5  17.0
Refused  0.9
MARITAL  STATUS  (1992  figures)
Married  60.5  61.2
Separated  2.6
Divorced  12.2  8.8
Widowed  7.7  7.3
Never been Married  16.3  22.7
Refused  0.7
From the  Statistical  Abstract of the United States,  1993,  The  National Data  Book, Bureau  of the  Census.55
TableA.2
Probability  that  Program  A is Preferred  (Weighted  Data)
Program Characteristic  Utility function  t-statistics  Expected sign of
coefficients"  coefficient
EFFICACY OF PROGRAM*  0.5076  6.07  Positive
SERIOUSNESS OF RISK CONTROLLED*  0.6558  13.25  Positive
APPROPRIATENESS OF GOVT.  0.2850  5.97  Positive
INTERVENTION*
FAIRNESS OF PROGRAM FUNDING*  0.1797  5.51  Positive
EASE WITH WHICH RISK CAN BE  -0.1151  -4.83  Negative
AVOIDED*
TIME LAG BEFORE PROGRAM SAVES  -0.0552  -1.98  Negative
LIVES*
EXTENT TO WHICH PROGRAM  -0.0155  -0.62  Negative
BENEFICIARY IS TO BLAME*
RESPONDENT AT RISK**  0.0755  2.63  Positive
LIVES SAVED  0.4041  50.37  Positive
OTHER BENEFITS FROM PROGRAM A  0.2571  4.83  Positive
OTHER BENEFITS FROM PROGRAM B  -0.2509  -4.98  Negative
PAIR I DUMMY  -0.0049  -0.08
PAIR 2 DUMMY  -0.1346  -2.65
PAIR 3 DUMMY  -0.0845  -1.72
PAIR 4 DUMMY  0.2727  3.73
PAIR 5DUMMY  0.1396  2.33
PAIR 6 DUMMY  -0.3168  -4.66
*  LN(Characteristic of Program A/Characteristic of Program B)
**  The coefficient for Lives Saved Ratio is I/a56
APPENDIX  B
Survey  Questions  for Program  Pair 1
(Smoking  Education  and Industrial  Pollution  Programs)
Now I'd like to ask you some questions about government programs to help control health
problems in the U.S.
I'm going to describe health problems in a state that is NOT the state you live in.  The
reason we are asking about ANOTHER state is because we'd like you to tell us what you think
would be the best program for SOCIETY, rather than the best program for you personally.
I'll describe programs that the government of this OTHER state could adopt to reduce the
number of deaths that occur each year, and ask you whether or not you think that state should
adopt these programs.
>PIA<I  am going to tell you about ways to reduce deaths from heart and lung disease.
Smoking is one cause of deaths from heart and lung disease. One way to reduce these
deaths is to teach elementary school children about the health risks of smoking, so that fewer of
them become smokers.
In the state I described, a program has been proposed that would require all elementary
schools to provide education to discourage children from becoming smokers.
On a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 means not at all effective and 10 means very effective, how
effective do you think such programs are in discouraging children from becoming smokers?
<1-10>RECORD ACTUAL NUMBER FROM I TO 10
<88>  DK
Why did you choose that rating?
[If PIA  ge 4 goto PIB]
[If P1  A <4 go to another program pair]
>PIB<If  the smoking education program is adopted, the cost of the program would be paid for
out of state taxes.57
On a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 means not at all important and  10 means very important,
how important is it that the state adopt this program?
<1-10>  RECORD ACTUAL NUMBER FROM I TO 10
<88>  DK
>P 1  C< Air pollution is another cause of deaths from heart and lung disease. One way to reduce
deaths from air pollution is to put pollution controls on industry.
In this same state a program has been proposed that would place pollution  controls on
industry.
On a scale of I to 10, where I means not at all effective and 10 means very effective, how
effective do you think such programs are in reducing people's exposure to air pollution  from
industry?
<I-10>RECORD  ACTUAL NUMBER FROM I TO 10
<88>  DK
Why did you choose that rating?
[If PIC ge 4 goto PID]
[If P1  C <4 go to another program pair]
>PI D<If the air pollution control program is adopted, the cost of the program would be paid for
by the industries' stockholders, employees and by consumers of the industries' products.
On a scale of I to 10, where I means not at all important and 10 means very important,
how important is it that the state adopt this program?
<1-10>RECORD ACTUAL NUMBER FROM I TO 10
<88>  DK
>P I  E< Suppose that the smoking education program and the air pollution control program would
save the SAME number of lives EACH YEAR.
If both programs cost the same, which one do you think would be best for society?  Remember,
the two programs save the SAME number of lives EACH YEAR.58
<1>  SMOKING EDUCATION [go to PIE1]
<2>  CONTROL OF INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION [go to pIe I]
<8>  DK [goto PII]
>PIEI<  Why is that?  [go to PIF]
>plel<  Why is that?  [go to P I G]
>PIF<  Suppose  that  instead  of  saving  the  same  number  of  lives,  the  AIR  POLLUTION
CONTROL PROGRAM saved MORE lives than the smoking education program.  Suppose that
it saved [fill xl]  TIMES as many lives as the smoking education program.  Would you still favor
adopting the smoking education program or would you change your mind?
<I> STILL FAVOR SMOKING EDUCATION PROGRAM [go to PIF1]
<2> CHIANGE  MIND [goto p I fl]
<3> OTHER (SPECTFY) [specify] [goto PI ]
<8> DK[goto P11]
>PIFI<  Why is that?
>plfl<  Why is that?
>PIG< Suppose that instead of saving the same number of lives, the SMOKING EDUCATION
PROGRAM saved MORE lives than the air pollution control program.  Suppose it saved [fill yl]
TIMES as many lives as the air pollution control program.  Would you still favor adopting the air
pollution control program or would you change your mind?
<I>  STILL FAVOR AIR POLLUTION CONTROL PROGRAM [PIGI]
<2> CHANGE MIND[goto plgl]
<3> OTHER (SPECIFY) [specify] [goto PII]
<8> DK [goto P11]
>PIGI<  Why is that?
>plgl<  Why is that?
>P 11< In choosing between the two programs, did you think about any other benefits that might
result from the smoking education program besides saving lives?
<0> NO
<I> YES  - What were they?: SPECIFY
<8> DK59
>P 1  J<  (In choosing between the two programs) did you think about any other benefits that might
result from  the air pollution control program besides saving lives?
<0> NO
<1> YES  - What were they?: SPECIFY
<8i  DK
>P I  L< In choosing between the two programs, did you think that the cost of the programs would
be the same?
<0>  NO [goto PI M]
<1> YES
<8> DK
>P 1  M<  Which program did you think would cost more?
<1> SMOKING EDUCATION PROGRAM
<2> AIR POLLUTION CONTROL PROGRAM
<8> DK
[FOLLOWING THE SECOND PROGRAMPAIR:]
When I asked you about the programs, did you think about them occurring in [fill respondent's
state ], another state, or nowhere in particular?
<1> [fill respondent's state]
<2> SOME OTHER STATE
<3> NOWHERE IN PARTICULAR
<8> DK
Now I would like to leam more about your attitudes toward government health and safety
programs.
How serious a health problem do you think smoking is?  (If I means not at all serious and
10 means extremely serious), (What number from 1 to 10 best describes how serious a health
problem smoking is?)
<1-10> RECORD ACTUAL NUMBER FROM I TO 10
<88>  DK60
How serious a health problem do you think industrial air pollution is? (If 1 means not at
all serious and 10 means extremely serious), (What number from 1 to 10 best describes how
serious a health problem industrial air pollution is?)
<1-10> RECORD ACTUAL NUMBER FROM 1 TO 10
<88>  DK
How appropriate do you think it is for the government to require schools to educate
children about the dangers of smoking? (If 1 means not at all appropriate and 10 means very
appropriate), (What number from 1 to 10 best describes how appropriate it is for the government
to require sc4ools to educate children about the dangers of smoking?)
<1-10> RECORD ACTUAL NUMBER FROM 1 TO 10
<88>  DK
How appropriate do you think it is for the government to impose pollution controls on
industry? (If I means not at all appropriate and 10 means very appropriate), (What number from
i to 10 best describes how appropriate it is for the governnent  to impose pollution controls on
industry?)
<I-10> RECORD ACTUAL NUMBER FROM I TO 10
<88>  DK
How fair do you think}  it is to fund the smoking education program out of state tax
revenues?  (If I means not at all fair and 10 means very fair),  (What number from I to 10 best
describes how fair it is to fund the smoking education program out of state tax revenues?)
<1-10> RECORD ACTUAL NUMBER FROM I TO 10
<88>  DK
How fair do you think it is for the cost of pollution controls on industry to be paid for by
the industries' stockholders, employees and consumers of the industries' products?  (If 1 means
not at all fair and 10 means very fair), (What number from I to 10 best describes how fair it is
for the cost of pollution controls to be paid for by the industries' stockholders, employees, and
consumers of the industries' products?)
<1-10> RECORD ACTUAL NUMBER FROM 1 TO 10
<88>  DK61
How easy do you think it is for young people to control whether or not they start to
smoke? If 1 means not at all easy and 10 means very easy, what number from 1 to 10 best
describes how easy is it for young people to control whether or not they start to smoke?
<1-10> RECORD ACTUAL NUMBER FROM I TO 10
<88>  DK
How easy do you think it is for people to avoid exposure to air pollution from industry?
(If 1 means not at all easy and 10 means very easy),  (What number from 1 to 10 best describes
how easy it is for people to avoid exposure to air pollution from industry?)
<1-10> RECORD ACTUAL NUMBER FROM 1 TO 10
<88>  DK
How long do you think it would be before the program to educate children about smoking
would BEGIN to save lives? If 1 means right away and 10 means not for a long time, what
number from 1 to 10 best describes how long before the program to educate children about
smoking would begin to save lives?
<1-10> RECORD ACTUAL NUMBER FROM I TO 10
<88>  DK
How long do you think it would be before the program to reduce industrial air pollution
would BEGIN to save lives'? (If 1 means right away and 10 means not for a long time),  (What
number from 1 to 10 best describes how long before the program to reduce industrial air
pollution would begin to save lives?)
<1-10> RECORD ACTUAL NUMBER FROM 1 TO 10
<88>  DK
How much do you think young people are to blame for smoking? (If 1 means not at all to
blame and 10 means very much to blame), (What number from 1 to 10 best describes how much
young people are to blame for smoking?)
<1-10> RECORD ACTUAL NUMBER FROM 1 TO 10
<88>  DK
How much do you think people are to blame for being exposed to industrial air pollution?
(If I means not at all to blame and 10 means very much to blame),  (What number from 1 to 10
best describes how much people are to blame for being exposed to industrial air pollution?)62
<1-10> RECORD ACTUAL NUMBER FROM 1 TO 10
<88>  DK
How likely do you think it is that smoking will cause a health problem for you or for
someone in your family? (If 1 means unlikely and 10 means likely),  (What number from 1 to 10
best describes how likely it is that smoking will cause a health problem for you or for someone in
your family?)
<1-10> RECORD ACTUAL NUMBER FROM 1 TO 10
<88>  DK
How likely do you think it is that industrial air pollution will cause a  health problem for
you or for someone in your family?  (If 1 means unlikely and 10 means likely), (What number
from 1 to 10 best describes how likely it is that industrial air pollution will cause a health
problem for you or for someone in your family?)




Branching pattern of program pairs.  Each respondent was faced with two pairs of programs.
In order to avoid presenting the respondent with the same program in both pairs, a computerized
procedure matched program pairs so that no two pairs had a program in common.  For instance,
no respondent would face Pair I  (Smoking Education - Industrial Air Pollution programs) and
Pair 4 ( Industrial Air Pollution Pneumonia Vaccine Programs.)
More specifically, no respondent could be faced with:
Pairs I and 4:  Smoking Education and Industrial Pollution Programs
Industrial Pollution and Pneumonia Vaccine Programs;
Pairs 5 and 6:  Radon Eradication and Smoking Ban Programs
Radon Eradication and Pesticide Ban Programs;
Pairs 1 and 5:  Smoking Education and Industrial Pollution Programs
Radon Eradication and Smoking Ban Programs
Design Values. Respondents were given program pairs where, initially, both programs in a pair
saved the same number of lives for the same cost.  After the respondent had made his choice, the
alternate program was presented as saving more lives than the one he chose initially.  If the
respondent chose Program A in any pair, then Program B was alleged to save [x] times as many
lives as Program A.  Similarly, for a respondent who initially chose B, Program A was presented
as saving [y] times as many lives as Program B.  For each program pair, nine x and y values
were selected to which respondents were randomly assigned.  Analysis of a pretest of 200
respondents  helped in selecting the design values for each pair.  The design values and the lives
saved ratios (XA  /XB ) are given in Table C. I below.@4
TABLE C.1
CHOICE  OF DESIGN VALUES AND THE RATIO  OF LIVES SAVED (XA/ XB)
Pair  I  Smoking  Education  Versus  Industrial  Air Pollution
x values  I  y values
Design values  50  1  0  5  3  3  5  10  50  100
XA/XB  0.02 T  0.1  0.2  0.33  3  5  10  50  100
Pair 2  Colon Cancer  Screening Versus  Drinking  Water  Pollution
x values  y values
Design Values  5  3  2  2  3  5  10  50  100
XA/ XB  0.2  0.33  0.5  2  3  5  10  50  100
Pair 3  Dual Airbags  Versus Automobile  Emissions
x values  y values
Design Values  50  10  3  2  3  5  10  050  T0
XA/ XB  0.02  0.1  0.33  0.5  3  5  1  0  1 00
Note:  XA = Number of lives saved by Program A
XB = Number of lives saved by Program B65
Pair  4  Industrial  Air Pollution  Versus Pneumonia  Vaccine
[  I  x values  y values
Design Values  300  100  50  1  0  5  3  2  50  lj  100
XA/XB  .003  0.01  0.02  0.1  0.2  5  10  50  |  CIO
Pair  5  Radon  Versus Smoking Ban In The Workplace
l  x values  y values
Design Values  50  10  3  2  3  5  10  50  100
XA/XB  0.021  0.33  2  3  5  10  50  100
Pair  6  Radon  versus Pesticide Ban
I  |  V2  x values  y values  1
Design Values  20  5  2  5  10  50  100  200  500
XA/ XB  0.05  0.2  0.5  5  10  50  100  200  500
Note:  XA = Number of lives saved by Program A
XB  = Number of lives saved by Program B66
APPENDIX D
Statistical Methods Used to Analyze Double-Sampled Data
Dichotomous choice questions that ask the respondent to make a choice between
two programs have the advantage that they are relatively easy to answer.  But, the amount
of information obtained by this approach is limited.  One obtains only an upper or lower
bound to willingness to pay (WTP).  Hanemann et al. (1991) show that it is possible to
increase the statistical efficiency of the estimates of the parameters by using a double-
sampling strategy.  That is, individuals are faced with two rounds of bidding.
Respondents are faced with a first dollar amount.  Then, depending on their answer to this
bid, the dollar amount is raised or lowered and presented to the respondent again, thereby
tightening the bounds on the individual's WTP.
In this survey the individual is first asked to choose between Programs A and B,
given that both programs save the same number of lives, or that the ratio of lives saved by
both programs equals 1,
I  I
XA  /XB  Number  of lives saved  by Program  A in first round
Ai  Bi  ~~Number  of lives saved by Program B in first round
Suppose the individual chooses Program A. Then a second question is asked where the
ratio of lives saved is changed so that Program A saves fewer lives,
2  1
XAi  /X  Bi  1
Similarly if the person chooses Program B then in the second question the number of




With this approach four possible outcomes are possible:
Option  1.  Program  A  - Program  A
Option  2.  Program  A  - Program  B
Option  3.  Program  B  - Program  B
Option  4.  Program  B  - Program  A
Let  cAA,  7tAB' JtBB  and 7 3A  be the likelihood of these outcomes respectively.
If the respondent chooses Option I--i.e. program A in both the questions--
JA  =P r{  E/C5 <  I/ a ln(XA  /X  ) + 13/  c ln (C  A/C  )B
and  Ai  B  1/2  1  Ai  Bi
and  Es/c <lI/ cln(X Ai /X Bi)  +13'/crln(C  IC  )67
=F[ 1/a  ln(X  2 XB ) +  Ai  cr (In (C  / CB)
Ai  Bi
Expressions  for  7tAB'  7tBB,  and 7nBA  can be derived similarly,
Ai  Bi  2  1  Ail B
AB  = F[ BY/  a  ( In (C  / C  )]-F[1/  a ln(X.  /X  )+ B/  (In (C  /C  )]
AB  1  ~~~2  AIi  %B  Ai  B
tBB  = F[1/ cy  ln(XAiA/XB  ) +  3'/  a  (ln(C / C  )] - F [B'/  a  (In  (C  /C  )]
1  2  Ail  B
7nBA  =  I  - F[ I/ a ln(XAi  /XBi )+B'/aC(ln(C  /C  )]
Given a sample of N respondents, the log likelihood function takes the form:
N
In LD=Z  {r  AA  ln7r,AA  + rAE ln7c  AB +rBB ln7t  BB + rBA Inn BA)
,=/
Where
rAA  = I if the respondent i chooses Program A in both the questions
= 0 otherwise
rAB'  = I if the respondent i chooses Program A in the first round and then switches in
the second question
= 0 otherwise
rBB  = I if the respondent i chooses Program B in both the questions
= 0 otherwise
rBA  = I if the respondent i chooses Program B in the first round and then switches in
the second question
= 0 otherwise
The parameters of this function can be estimated using maximum likelihood estimation
techniques.68
APPENDIX E
Estimates for Individual Program Pairs  (t-statistics in parentheses)
Table E.1
Smoking  Colon  Airbags vs.  Industrial Air  Radon vs.  Radon vs.  Expected Sign
Education  Cancer  Auto  Pollution vs.  Smoking  Pesticide Ban
vs.  Screening  Emissions  Pneum.  Ban
Industrial  vs. Drinkg  Vaccine
Air Poll.  water
Intercept  -0.0801  -0.155  0.218  0.146  -0.025  -0.824
(-0.29)  (-0.74)  (0.89)  (0.50)  (-0.092)  (-2.11)
Efficacy of Program  0.765  0.303  0.621  0.252  0.873  0.181  Positive
(3.21)  (1.48)  (3.32)  (1.08)  (3.75)  (0.56)
Seriousness of Risk  0.864  0.89  0.662  0.504  0.351  0.754  Positive
(3.12)  (7.53)  (5.31)  (2.87)  (1.85)  (3.16)
Appropriateness of  0.406  0.239  0.367  0.365  0.282  0.265  Positive
Govemment  (2.04)  (2.11)  (3.32)  (2.38)  (2.44)  (1.02)
Intervention
Fairness of Program  0.141  0.052  0.157  0.182  0.026  0.177  Positive
Funding  (1.09)  (0.74)  (1.57)  (1.71)  (0.28)  (1.5)
Ease with which Risk  0.005  -0.011  -0.243  -0.179  -0.096  -0.084  Negativc
can be Avoided  (0.061)  (-0.17)  (4.08)  (-2.23)  (-1.38)  (-0.89)
Time Lag Before  -0.111  -0.042  -0.005  -0.113  -0.053  -0.049  Negative
Program save lives  (-1.18)  (-0.59)  (-0.07)  (-1.4)  (-0.61)  (-0.35)
Extent to Which  -0.062  0.065  -0.047  -0.047  -0.027  0.074  Negative
Program Beneficiary  (.0.91)  (1.13)  (-0.72)  (-0.6)  (-0.43)  (0.66)
is to Blame
Respondent at  Risk  0.038  -0.105  0.136  0.071  0.238  0.135  Positive
(0.49)  (-1.39)  (1.94)  (0.9)  (2.55)  (1.22)
Other Benefits from A  0.273  0.197  0.091  0.374  0.181  0.415  Positive
(1.71)  (1.43)  (0.688)  (2.37)  (1.02)  (1.28)
Other Benefits from B  -0.317  -0.272  -0.321  -0.327  -0.131  -0.029  Negative
(-1.87)  (-2.01)  (-2.62)  (-2.09)  (-0.87)  (-0.13)
Lives Saved Ratio  0.392  0.553  0.358  0.477  0.429  0.375  Positive
(16.57)  (23.1)  (20.12)  (16.77)  (17.03)  (13.83)69
Table E.2
Estimates for Individual Program Pairs
Smoking  Colon  Airbags vs.  Industrial Air  Radon vs.  Radon vs.
Education vs.  Cancer  Auto  Pollution vs.  Smoking Ban  Pesticide Ban
Industrial Air  Screening vs.  Emissions  Pneum
Poll  Drinkg water  Vaccine
Intercept  0.84  0.696  0.112  0.129  -0.338  0.136
(1.27)  (1.93)  (0.29)  (0.26)  (-0.69)  (0.25)
Efficacy of  0.759  0.356  0.618  0.242  0.867  0.127
Program  (3.17)  (1.71)  (3.3)  (1.01)  (3.69)  (0.38)
Seriousness of Risk  0.859  0.879  0.662  0.51  0.353  0.728
(3.15)  (7.37)  (5.21)  (2.87)  (1.82)  (2.83)
Appropriateness of  0.379  0.219  0.366  0.366  0.282  0.246
Government  (1.92)  (1.93)  (3.27)  (2.32)  (2.39)  (0.84)
Intervention
Fairness of  0.176  0.064  0.157  0.165  0.019  0.158
Program Funding  (0.13)  (0.92)  (1.58)  (1.49)  (0.21)  (1.3)
Ease with which  0.019  -0.004  -0.245  -0.183  -0.097  -0.108
Risk can be  (0.25)  (-0.06)  (-4.02)  (-2.29)  (-1.37)  (-1.13)
Avoided
Time Lag Before  -0.119  -0.058  -0.005  -0.099  -0.055  -0.038
Program Saves  (-1.27)  (-0.8)  (-0.07)  (-1.2)  (-0.63)  (0.27)
Lives
Extent to which  -0.073  0.053  -0.047  -0.047  -0.022  0.059
program  (-1.03)  (0.9)  (-0.71)  (-0.6)  (-0.35)  (0.52)
beneficiary is to
blame
Respondent at  0.042  -0.106  0.138  0.077  0.234  0.148
Risk  (0.53)  (-1.39)  (1.95)  (0.93)  (2.5)  (1.24)
Other Benefits  0.286  0.22  0.092  0.406  0.156  0.385
from  A  (1.8)  (1.55)  (0.69)  (2.56)  (0.87)  (1.21)
Other Benefits  -0.316  -0.244  -0.323  -0.337  -0.142  0.035
from B  (-1.88)  (-1.75)  (-2.6)  (-2.09)  (-0.94)  (0.14)
Program A costs  -0.416  -0.179  0.037  -0.15  0.127  -0.45
more  (-1.05)  (-1.3)  (0.19)  (-0.95)  (0.78)  (-1.84)
Program B costs  -0.311  -0.602  0.046  0.183  0.146  -0.393
more  (-1.91)  (-3.65)  (0.37)  (0.66)  (0.59)  (-1.53)
Lives Saved Ratio  0.396  0.567  0.358  0.479  0.429  0.379
(15.87)  (22.73)  (19.83)  (16.83)  (16.99)  (13.86)70
APPENDIX  F
Model Predictability
The matrices on the following page compare actual and predicted program choices
for respondents based on two models.  In Table F. I respondents'  choices are predicted
using the pooled model described in the text, including all measured program
characteristics.  In Table F.2, respondents' choices are predicted using only the ration of
lives saved.
The sum of the elements of along the diagonal of each of the matrices indicates
the number of times the model's predictions are correct.  When all the eight qualitative
variables are included along with  the Lives Saved Ratio and the Other Benefit variables,
the model predicts correctly 36.6% of the time.  With all the qualitative characteristics
excluded, when the Lives Saved Ratio is included as the only explanatory variable, the
predictive power of the model drops to 29.7%, implying that including the qualitative
characteristics improves the ability of the econometric model to predict correctly.
Several other points about Table F. I and F.2  are worth noting:
There is a tendency to overpredict program B rather than prograrn A in the first
question. The model predicts 1,111 persons as choosing B when in reality only 937
respondents chose program B.  Also, the number of  times the model incorrectly predicts
a respondent as choosing B, in the first question,  is more frequent than the number of
times it wrongly predicts a person as choosing program A.
The model also tends to under-predict the number of switches in the second
choice question for both programs A and B. That is, respondents are divided almost
evenly between AA and AB by the model prediction.  Similarly,  BA and BB are
predicted to be almost even.  But in reality, 66% of those who chose A initially and 60%
of those who chose B in the first question switched preference when the second choice
question was asked.
When all qualitative variables are excluded and only the  Lives Saved Ratio is
included in the model, the tendency to over predict program B is aggravated. The
number predicted as choosing program B (BB + BA) is  1,477 instead of the actual 937
persons.  Again, the number of times the model falsely predicts the choice of Program B
exceeds the number of times the model falsely predicts the choice of program A.71
Table  F.1
ACTUAL v. PREDICTED CHOICES
ALL QUALITATIVE VARIABLES INCLUDED IN THE MODEL
Predicted
AA  AB  BA  BB
AA  94  69  57  39
Actual  AB  137  116  145  105
BA  63  58  233  205
BB  21  30  148  179
Table  F.2
ACTUAL v. PREDICTED CHOICE
LIVES SAVED RATIO IS THE ONLY EXPLANATORY VARIABLE
Predicted
AA  AB  BA  BB
AA  12  28  100  119
Actual  AB  14  64  202  223
BA  14  50  265  230
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